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Abstract
We investigate how different designs of carbon offset mechanisms like the Ky-
oto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) affect the success of self-
enforcing climate treaties. In a game-theoretic numerical model of coalition for-
mation it is shown that effects of emission trading with non-signatories are nega-
tive if strategic behaviour and free-rider incentives are explicitly considered. Even
imposing selling targets on credit supplying countries do not change this result.
Larger stable coalitions are achieved when the treaty is designed such that its sig-
natories do not use the gains from credit trading to lower their emission caps but
stick to modest abatement targets to keep leakage effects at a minimum. Selling
targets that introduce some “hot air” may exacerbate this effect on participation,
albeit without a substantial effect on welfare.
1 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol introduced three flexible mechanisms. The emission trading sys-
tem (ETS) and joint implementation (JI) allow to trade emission entitlements among
Annex-I countries, those countries which accepted emission ceilings. In contrast, the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) provides an opportunity for Annex-I countries
to buy emission credits from non-Annex-I countries, i.e. mainly developing countries,
which have not accepted emission ceilings. The CDM includes an additionality clause
which requires that emission credits offered by non-Annex I-countries must correspond
to a reduction of emission levels “below [what] would have occurred in the absence of
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, PO Box 60 12 03, D-14412 Potsdam, Germany
†Department of Economics, University of Bath, 3 East, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK
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the registered CDM project activity” (UNFCCC, 2002, p. 43). All three flexible mech-
anisms provide opportunities to save abatement costs. This is in particular true for the
CDM because the difference in marginal abatement costs between Annex-I and non
Annex-I countries is likely to be large. On the one hand, Annex-I countries have to
resort to increasingly costly abatement options to meet their emission caps. On the
other hand, non-Annex-I countries do not face such constraints on their emissions. Ad-
ditionally, they typically face less steep abatement cost functions compared to Annex-I
countries.1 As compliance costs are a major obstacle for signing ambitious climate
treaties, one is inclined to expect that all flexible mechanisms, and in particular the
CDM, should have a positive effect on the incentive to sign a climate treaty. However,
the question arises whether this conclusion is also true when departing from the as-
sumption of a first-best world, explicitly considering strategic effects and the need for
self-enforcing treaties due to the lack of a supranational enforcement power. Given the
current (so far futile) efforts to negotiate a Post-Kyoto agreement, it is therefore of great
importance to understand how the design of offset mechanisms will affect participation
and the success of future climate treaties.
In a strategic context, there are at least two reasons why a credit trading scheme
between members and non-members of a climate treaty may not have the intended
positive effect on the success of a climate treaty. First, the option of emission credit
trading will affect equilibrium emissions of members and non-members. If abatement
cost savings translate into more ambitious abatement targets of members and this is
matched by less abatement by non-members, free-riding may become more attractive.
This is an equilibrium effect associated with carbon-leakage. Second, CDM-trading
offers a win-win situation, but the gains from trade may unevenly distributed between
members and non-members. If the gains for non-members are larger than for members,
the incentive to free-ride may well increase.
The first issue may be addressed by restricting the members’ choices of emission
allowances such that the gains from trade are not used for the implementation of more
ambitious abatement targets. The second issue could be fixed through the implemen-
tation of selling targets.2 If non-Annex-I countries can only sell emission credits that
correspond to emission reductions below baseline emissions, a share of the gains from
trade can be shifted to the members, making it more attractive for members to stay in
a climate treaty and/or for non-members to join a treaty. We investigate the different
options in a systematic way.
Our paper draws on two strands of literature. The first strand analyzes the stability
of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. This literature goes back to
Barrett (1994), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), and Hoel (1992). Since then various
departures from the standard model have been analyzed which include for instance is-
sue linkage (Barrett, 1997; Botteon and Carraro, 1998; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1997;
Folmer et al., 1993; Lessmann and Edenhofer, 2010; Lessmann et al., 2009), a mini-
mum participation clause (Carraro et al., 2009; Weikard et al., 2009), multiple agree-
1This is for instance illustrated by the marginal abatement cost curves from two integrated assessment
models reported in Criqui et al. (1999).
2Selling targets (Kim and Baumert, 2002), similar to non-binding targets (Philibert, 2000) and no-lose
targets (Meckling and Chung, 2009), specify an emission path relative to a baseline and only below this
emission path emission reductions can be sold as credits.
2
ments (Asheim et al., 2006; Eyckmans and Finus, 2006; Finus and Rundshagen, 2003)
and modest emission reductions (Barrett, 2002; Finus and Maus, 2008). The two pa-
pers closest to ours are Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) and Hoel and Schneider
(1997). However, the first paper analyzes emission trading only among coalition mem-
bers, and not among coalition members and outsiders as we do. Moreover, in their TU
(transferable utility)-setting, equilibrium emissions are not affected by permit trading,
but only the distribution of the gains from cooperation. The second paper considers
the possibility that coalition members buy additional emission reductions from non-
members, even though Hoel and Schneider do not use the term CDM. But, as argued in
Finus (2003, p. 116-118), this paper suffers from a couple of conceptual shortcomings
which by construction lead to smaller coalitions through the CDM.
The second strand of literature analyzes the strategic incentive under a permit trad-
ing scheme with endogenous choice of emission allowances, but stability of treaties
is tested in a rather simplistic way. In a stylized model, Helm (2003) compares the
Nash equilibrium without trading to the Nash equilibrium in which permit trading is
anticipated . He shows that the effect of permit trading on global emissions is ambigu-
ous: countries with steep damage cost functions may abate more but countries with flat
damage cost functions may choose larger emission allowances. His results are driven
by countries anticipating how their allowance choices influence the equilibrium permit
price and hence their revenues from trade. Furthermore, he shows that an agreement
on permit trading that reduces emissions globally may be vetoed by individual coun-
tries because it makes them worse off. And, conversely, an agreement implying higher
global emissions may be endorsed by all countries due to its welfare enhancing effect.
However, the decision whether to participate in an agreement abstracts from strategic
membership decisions and is only based on the concept of profitability, similar to the
analysis conducted in Carbone et al. (2009) who base their analysis on a calibrated
CGE-model. Moreover, in their paper, the design of an agreement is different from
our game-theoretic model of coalition formation. In our paper, members of an agree-
ment cooperate and internalize the externality among their members (though not with
outsiders). In contrast, in Carbone et al. (2009) countries entering an agreement just
benefit from the possibility of permit trading, but all countries decide non-cooperatively
on their emission allowances before trade takes place.
In what follows, in Section 2, we first discuss the setup and develop an intuitive
understanding of the main driving forces. Then we informally introduce our numerical
model in Section 3 and provide the details in the Appendix. Section 4 reports and
discusses our results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Model: Setting, Policy Options and Driving Forces
2.1 The coalition formation game
The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of various designs of the CDM on
the success of self-enforcing international environmental agreements. We follow the
mainstream of the literature and model an agreement as a two-stage cartel formation
game with N players. In the first stage, players decide on membership, i.e. whether to
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sign the agreement and hence become a coalition member (which we sometimes also
call signatory), or to remain a non-member (to which we refer sometimes also as non-
signatory), acting as a singleton. In the second stage, players decide on their economic
strategies. In our model this relates to the choice of emission allowances, with the
decision on exporting (importing) of excess (shortfall) allowances following from the
market equilibrium in the CDM-market. The game is solved by backwards induction.
In each stage, equilibria form a Nash equilibrium.
In the second stage, we solve for a Nash equilibrium between the coalition and the
remaining players, often termed Partial Agreement Nash equilibrium (PANE, Chander
and Tulkens, 1995) in the specific context of a single coalition, a special case of the
social coalitional equilibrium (Ichiishi, 1981). This implies that the coalition de facto
act as a single player, coordinating strategies such as to internalizing the externalities
among coalition members. Non-members simply maximize their welfare. In the first
stage, we apply the concept of cartel stability following d’Aspremont and Gabszewicz
(1986) . In equilibrium, players have no incentive to revise their membership strategy,
given the strategies of other players. That is, a coalition is internally stable if no mem-
ber has an incentive to leave and externally stable if no non-member wants to join the
coalition. Note that for symmetric players, following Hoel (1992) and Finus and Maus
(2008) stability can be compactly summarized by a stability function,
F=Wi2S(n) Wi=2S(n 1), (1)
with a coalition of n symmetric members being internally stable if the stability function
is non-negative at n and externally stable if it is negative at n+1 and where S denotes
the coalition andWi individual welfare of player i.
The details of the underlying economic model are further explained in Section 3
and all details are provided in the Appendix.
2.2 CDM policy designs
In our model, all regions can decrease their emissions by lowering their emission-
intensity of production. In addition, coalition members have a second option for mit-
igating climate change: they can buy permits on the international CDM emissions
trading market. This is implemented through the choice of emission allowances for
all regions. A region’s actual emissions may exceed its allowances if the shortfall is
matched by imported emission permits. Likewise, regions may export emission per-
mits, selling surplus emission allowances by choosing lower emissions. In the analysis
of different designs of offset mechanisms, we consider the following scenarios.
NT As a benchmark, we consider the “No Trade” scenario without permit trade. This
allows to explore the incremental effects of allowing for CDM-trade; all discussions of
relative effects will be related to the NT-scenario. Note that we also sometimes re-
fer to the non-cooperative equilibrium, which is different. The NT-scenario allows for
the possibility of coalition formation whereas the non-cooperative equilibrium corre-
sponds to the “all singletons coalition structure” (though also without trade because no
coalition exists).
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CDM/xa This scenario assumes that the possibility of CDM-trading is an integral
part of the climate treaty, and that it is fully taken into account when the decisions
on emission allowances are made. That is, the combined choices of CDM-trade and
allowances maximize welfare. In this sense, the possibility of CDM-trading is an ex
ante feature of the treaty.
CDM/xp This scenario assumes that CDM-trading is added to the climate treaty to
reduce implementation costs as much as possible, i.e. to achieve cost-effectiveness
in abatement while allowance choices remain at their NT-benchmark values. Thus,
CDM-trading only improves the treaty ex post. That is, equilibrium abatement remains
at the NT-benchmark level and trading “only” improves on cost-effectiveness. This
design requires the ability of coalition members to commit themselves to constraints
on allowance choices, similar to the commitment required in minimum participation
clauses, burden sharing rules, or ‘modest’ abatement targets.3
Selling targets We generalize the Kyoto Protocol’s concept of additionality by in-
troducing selling targets for the CDM-supplier. A selling target specifies reductions
relative to the NT-baseline scenario that need to be achieved before any emission cred-
its can be sold. We refer to a selling target below the NT-baseline as being stringent,
and a selling target above the baseline is said to produce hot air. Our default require-
ment of additionality corresponds to the special case of taking the NT-baseline as the
selling target, i.e. a selling target sel = 0:0. In contrast, a selling target sel = 0:1 would
require 10 percent additional emission reduction below the NT-baseline.
2.3 General effects of CDM-trading on stability of agreements
In this section, we briefly discuss some general effects of CDM-trading on the stability
of coalitions. Recall that stability comprises internal and external stability. The ef-
fect of trade may positively effect the payoff of members and non-members and hence
overall conclusions depend on the relative size of these effects. In the following, we
split the overall effect into separate effects, even though in equilibrium all effects occur
simultaneously in most scenarios. We distinguish three groups of players: a) members,
b) non-members and c) a representative CDM-supplier. Members choose their emis-
sion allowances cooperatively and if their actual emissions exceed those, they can buy
credits from the CDM-supplier. Members if they leave the agreement become non-
members. Non-members choose their emission allowances non-cooperatively but can-
not trade credits, as long as they do not join the agreement. Finally, the CDM-supplier
chooses emission allowances and if the actual emissions falls short of allowances, he
can sell credits to members. The CDM-supplier does not take a membership deci-
sion, though he will only engage in credit trading if this improves his welfare position
compared to the NT-scenario.4
3See, for example Courtois and Haeringer (2012).
4assumption of a representative CDM-supplier allows us to determine the equilibrium in the first stage
as the endogenous outcome of the membership game between N 1 symmetric players, deciding whether to
become a member or non-member.
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Taken together, only the CDM-supplier and members are directly affected by sell-
ing and buying of permits, but non-members are indirectly affected through a change
of equilibrium emissions.
i. Cost-effectiveness Effect. Trade between coalition members and the CDM-sup-
plier occurs whenever the marginal abatement costs of the CDM-supplier are
lower than those of coalition members. Then, the coalition can substitute own
costly abatement by cheaper CDM-permits. Provided coalitional abatement is
solely replaced (but not increased) by cheaper CDM-permits, the cost-effective-
ness effect exclusively benefits those involved in the transaction. If total abate-
ment efforts remain constant, non-signatories are unaffected by trade. Overall, it
becomes more attractive to stay in the coalition and/or to join the coalition.
ii. Ambition Effect. If signatories anticipate the options of permit-trading, the possi-
bility of buying credits de facto shifts their marginal abatement cost curve down-
ward. Consequently, in equilibrium, the coalition will increase its abatement
efforts, choosing lower emission allowances. This will have a positive effect on
signatories but the effect on non-signatories will be even greater since they will
get the extra abatement at zero cost. Hence, the net effect on the size of stable
coalitions is most likely negative.
iii. Leakage Effect. For downward sloping reaction-functions in abatement (because
abatement levels are strategic substitutes), additional abatement by signatories
will be partially offset by increased emissions of non-signatories, which is typ-
ically called carbon leakage. This undermines the position of signatories while
saving costs of non-signatories. The leakage effect will clearly lead to smaller
stable coalitions.
As the first effect has a positive, the third effect a negative and the second effect also
most likely a negative effect on forming large stable coalitions, a quantitative analysis
is necessary to draw overall conclusions. This will be conducted with a numerical
model which is described subsequently.
3 Numerical model
3.1 Model dynamics
We use an extended version of the numerical model MICA (Modeling International
Climate Agreements) in our analysis, which builds on the multi-region optimal growth
model with international trade presented in Lessmann et al. (2009). The most important
extension concerns the trade of emission permits. The details of the model are provided
in the Appendix.
MICA is an optimal growth model of the Ramsey-type with N world regions. Each
region allocates income to either consumption or investment at every point in time. Re-
gions maximize welfare, which is the net present value of utility, either by themselves
or, when part of the coalition, jointly with the other members. We assume a standard
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utilitarian utility function, i.e. utility is increasing in per capita consumption with di-
minishing marginal utility and is discounted at the pure rate of time preference. Income
stems from the production of a single good, assuming a neoclassical production func-
tion with capital and labor as factor inputs. Economic growth is driven by exogenous
population growth as well as exogenously improving labor productivity.
Greenhouse gas emissions are modeled as a byproduct of economic activities. Total
global emissions drive greenhouse gas concentration, which in turn determines the
temperature increase relative to pre-industrial levels. The damage function, adapted
from Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), translates global warming into negative economic
impacts. Impacts can be reduced at the cost of investing in a generic mitigation option,
which lowers the emission intensity of economic production.
An alternative way of meeting emission targets is to buy emission allowances from
other regions. In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, we impose two restrictions on
emission credit trading between coalition members and outsiders. (1) Under the Kyoto
Protocol, countries that provide CDM-credits must be signatories of the protocol but
without abatement commitment (i.e. they are non Annex-I countries) and conversely
Annex-I countries cannot offer CDM credits. This is why we distinguish between “reg-
ular” non-members and a representative CDM-supplier who can offer CDM-credits to
coalition members but who will never join the coalition. We assume that the CDM-
supplier has little own motivation to reduce emissions. (2) Following the Kyoto Proto-
col’s additionality clause, we make it a default requirement that CDM credits represent
true emission reductions (as opposed to so called “hot air” ).5 Additionality is defined
in relation to the no trading scenario (NT scenario). We assume a perfectly compet-
itive market of emission credits. Trade in goods is the means to finance imports of
allowances. Goods from different regions are perfect substitutes.
3.2 Calibration
In most parts of the analysis, we restrict our attention to symmetric players as it is com-
mon practice in many stylized models of coalition formation (e.g. Ulph, 2004; Barrett,
2006; Carraro et al., 2009). This renders the analysis much simpler and in particular
more transparent. Nevertheless, we calibrate the model such that aggregate values (e.g.
total global emissions, economic output as well as greenhouse gas concentration and
temperature increase) correspond to those of other climate-economy growth models,
e.g. RICE-2010 (Nordhaus, 2010), REMIND-R (Leimbach et al., 2010), or WITCH
(Bosetti et al., 2006). The model is run over 250 years in 10 year periods, but reported
results relate to the first 100 years. For instance, in the business-as-usual scenario,
which corresponds to the non-cooperative equilibrium with no CDM-trade, average
economic growth over the next century is approximately 2.4 percent (cf. 2.2 percent
in RICE-2010), and CO2 emissions rise from close to 8GtC in 2005 to about 20GtC in
2105 (cf. 7.8GtC and 19.5GtC in RICE-2010), triggering a temperature rise by 2.0C
in 2105 with climate change damages amounting to 6.1 percent of economic output
(cf. 2.8C and 3.3 percent in RICE-2010). In contrast, under full cooperative behavior
5In model runs without such an additionality constraint the CDM-supplier prefers to sell large amounts
of “hot air.” Naturally, this turns out to have a strongly negative effect on coalition stability, as buying “hot
air” drives up the costs of being a coalition member, making an effective climate policy even more unlikely.
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Figure 1: Stability functions with no CDM-trading (NT), and
with the CDM-clause negotiated ex ante (CDM/xa) and ex post
(CDM/xp)
(i.e. all climate change damages are internalized), global CO2 emissions in 2105 are
13.8GtC; the associated increase in global mean temperature is 1.5C with damages
amounting to 4.1 percent of economic output in that year (cf. 2.0C and 2.3 percent in
RICE-2010).6
4 Results
4.1 No Trade-baseline (NT)
We begin with our benchmark, the no trade scenario. The stability functionF is shown
in Figure 1, which we may recall is the difference between the welfare of a player as a
member in a coalition with n members, and the welfare when he leaves the coalition,
becoming a non-member, and hence the coalition size is n 1 (Equation 1). As men-
tioned in Section 2.1, a coalition with n symmetric members is stable if the stability
function is non-negative at n and negative at n+ 1. Thus, the stability function of the
NT-scenario indicates that only a coalition of 2 players is stable.
6Data from RICE-2010 has been taken from Nordhaus (2010) and its supporting material if possible, and
from the available spreadsheet version of the model otherwise.
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4.2 Ex-ante CDM-trading without selling targets (CDM/xa)
Figure 1 also shows how coalition stability changes when CDM-trading is part of the
agreement and accounted for in allowance choices (denoted CDM/xa). Evidently, in-
troducing CDM-trading is counterproductive for participation as the stability function
lies below the stability function of the NT-baseline scenario (the effect is less pro-
nounced at coalition size 2 because defecting from this coalition means that no coop-
erating countries can be exploited by non-cooperating countries).
The reason is that the ambition effect identified in Section 2.3 outweighs any ben-
efits from the cost-effectiveness accruing to the coalition (the third effect, the leakage
effect, turns out to be negligible). Figures 2 and 3 show the interaction of coalition
member and CDM-supplier in detail. Without CDM-trade, the CDM-supplier emits
substantially more than coalition members (NT). But in the CDM/xa scenario, the
CDM-supplier reduces emissions down to the level of allowances chosen by coalition
members: at this level, marginal abatement costs equal the permit price. The CDM
credits are purchased by the coalition and the benefits are mainly used to aim for more
ambitious abatement targets rather than to replace domestic abatement (cf. member
allowance choice in Figure 2).
Overall, the abatement cost reduction from CDM-trade results in lower global emis-
sions. Thus, non-members benefit from lower damages. Though coalition members
also benefit from lower damages but due to the increased net abatement by the coali-
tion, total abatement costs will not necessarily drop. Therefore, the gains from trading
are larger for non-members than for members and hence it becomes more attractive to
leave a coalition of a given size as displayed in Figure 1.
4.3 Ex-ante CDM-trade with selling targets (CDM/xa/sel)
Figure 4 provides an alternative illustration why CDM trade does not lead to larger
coalitions. It shows the gains from CDM-trade, i.e. the increase in global welfare as
measured by the models objective function, relative to welfare in the NT-baseline sce-
nario. These gains are unequally distributed among the different groups of players.
For the default value of a zero selling target, which corresponds to the additionality as-
sumption, the welfare gains are appropriated by non-members and the CDM-supplier.
In particular the CDM-supplier benefits from selling emission allowances to coalition
members. This is shown in Figure 4 for a fixed coalition size of two members, but it
also holds for other coalition sizes. This figure also shows that the coalition members
suffer a slight loss of welfare relative to the NT-scenario.
Figure 4 also visualizes how the gains from CDM-trade may be shifted from the
CDM-supplier to coalition members using selling targets. Selling targets specify emis-
sion reductions for the CDM-supplier relative to his business-as-usual emissions pro-
jected for this particular coalition size (in our case this is the NT-scenario) that they
need to achieve before engaging in CDM-trade. For instance, a selling target of 0.2 im-
plies that the CDM-supplier has to reduce 20 percent compared to baseline emissions
before selling emission credits.
More stringent selling targets shift welfare gains from the CDM-supplier to coali-
tion members. Essentially, by imposing selling targets, the coalition receives an emis-
9
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sion reduction up to the selling target for free and only pays for additional emission
reductions beyond the target. These gains come at the expense of the CDM-supplier.
In equilibrium, global levels of welfare and emissions remain constant for all selling
targets because the selling targets do not alter marginal abatement costs and marginal
damages, which in turn determine the efficient allocation of abatement.7 This is evident
from Figure 5, which shows the change in global totals of emissions (in tons of carbon)
and welfare (in terms of social welfare as defined by the model’s objective function)
brought about by CDM-trade: positive numbers indicate that CDM-trade raises emis-
sions (or welfare).
In view of the fact that selling targets improve welfare of coalition members, a pos-
itive effect of selling targets on stability is very plausible. Indeed, the stability function
for CDM/xa in Figure 1 would shift upwards with more stringent selling targets (not
shown). Yet, no coalition larger than two members is stable. The largest stable coalition
is therefore unchanged.
In summary, the first type of offset design in the form of adding a CDM to the coali-
tion agreement has a negative impact on coalition stability: the benefits from CDM-
trade are realized on the side of the CDM-supplier rather than on the side of coalition
members; more importantly, non-members’ welfare is increased, which raises the in-
centive to free-ride. Selling targets allow to counteract this effect. However, this is not
sufficient to raise participation above the NT-benchmark.
4.4 Ex-Post CDM-trade without selling targets (CDM/xp)
From the previous section it became apparent that CDM-credit trading encourages free-
riding when coalition members anticipate CDM-trade prior to (ex ante) their abatement
decision, and hence abate in excess of the NT-scenario. In an alternative design for
the offset mechanism, CDM-trade is introduced solely to reduce compliance costs for
a given level of allowance choices. Essentially, this places a constraint on coalition
members’ emission allowances such that they cannot exceed abatement under the NT-
scenario.
Analogously to the CDM/xa-scenario, the CDM/xp-scenario is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 5. For the default additionality assumption (i.e.
a zero selling target) global welfare gains in the CDM/xp scenario fall short of those
in the CDM/xa, previously considered, because the additional constraint in CDM/xp
prevents further abatement by the coalition (cf. global emissions in the same figure).
Furthermore, we see that due to the additionality clause and the ex post setting, equi-
librium allowances of members and CDM-supplier correspond to their NT-baseline
emissions, and their emissions are higher than under CDM/xa (Figures 2 and 3). Coali-
tion stability is improved under CDM/xp such that a coalition of four players becomes
stable (Figure 1). We now turn to explore whether selling targets could help to improve
stability further as they did in the CDM/xa scenario.
7Similar to the findings in Manne and Stephan (2005), a separability of equity and efficiency (i.e. the
distribution of abatement burden and welfare) holds in MICA due to the feature of international trade in
goods.
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4.5 Ex-Post CDM-trade with selling targets (CDM/xp/sel)
The effect of selling targets on global emissions and welfare is shown in Figure 5.
Selling targets require additional abatement from the CDM-supplier, and abatement of
the coalition is effectively fixed by the CDM/xp assumption. Therefore, selling tar-
gets reduce global emissions. Since this moves global emissions closer to the social
optimum, it has a positive impact on global welfare. Quite contrary from CDM/xa,
selling targets only redistributed welfare gains among players, leaving the global lev-
els of welfare and emissions untouched. Also in contrast to CDM/xa, where member
gain approaches non-member gain, here it is advantage in welfare gain of the member
that declines with more stringent selling targets, making a stable coalition less likely
(Figures 4 and 6). For CDM/xp, both members and non-members alike benefit from
globally reduced emission levels. Members also benefit from a bounty of cheap CDM
credits but with more stringent selling targets, credits become scarcer and more ex-
pensive, thus diminishing this benefit. For negative selling targets (i.e. hot air) this
trend is reversed. While the world may be worse off with negative selling targets (e.g.
 0:2) for a given coalition size (Figure 5) and likewise for members and non-members
(Figure 6), the negative effect on non-members exceeds that on members. Both are neg-
atively affected by the higher global emission level. However, for coalition members
this is partially offset by the greater amount of CDM-credits which are now available
at a lower price, leading to a stabilization of a coalition of five members for a selling
target of  0:2. Thus, there is a trade-off between global welfare and environmental ef-
fectiveness by allowing for hot air which leads to larger coalitions. The effect is similar
to the idea of “modest” emission reductions analyzed in Finus and Maus (2008).
Figure 7 summarizes the effect of credit trading on participation in the agreement
and global welfare. Under CDM/xp we find a positive effect of CDM credit trading
on coalition stability, i.e. an increase in participation. Figure 7 also indicates the level
of welfare associated with stable coalitions that are achieved due to trading in CDM-
credits on a scale from 0 percent (non-cooperative equilibrium) to 100 percent (full
cooperation, social optimum). For CDM/xp, welfare increases with coalition size and
selling targets. But since more stringent selling targets reduce participation, these two
effects offset each other. In fact, two effects are estimated to have about the same
strength such that the net effect of having a small coalition with stringent selling targets
is about the same as forming a larger coalition by allowing “hot air” into the system.
The CDM/xa scenario is much simpler. The largest stable coalition has two mem-
bers unless CDM-trade is not profitable for its members, or “hot air” undermines the
stability. Where CDM-trade is not profitable, we have omitted the data point from Fig-
ure 7. As discussed previously, the global welfare achieved by 2 player coalition is
independent of selling targets.
Both CDM/xa and CDM/xp improve upon the NT-baseline, and overall, both achieve
similar levels of global welfare, irrespective of selling targets.
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Figure 6: Welfare gains from CDM-trade (CDM/xp/sel) relative
to the NT scenario assuming a representative stable coalition of
four players.
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case.
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5 Conclusion
This paper explored how the success of a self-enforcing climate agreement is affected
by emission trading between members and non-members. This captures the concept
of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the current Kyoto Protocol. In
a first-best world, the CDM will clearly have an unequivocally positive effect, as it
lowers total abatement cost. However, in a world with strategic interaction and free-
rider incentives, this is less evident. If the gains from CDM-trade are higher for non-
members than for members, participation in a climate treaty is actually discouraged.
More specifically, in our game-theoretic model of coalition formation, two main driv-
ing forces could be identified which illustrate that conclusions are anything else than
straightforward. On the one hand, the option of emission credit trading will affect
equilibrium emissions of members and non-members of a climate agreement. If the
cost saving potential from trade translates into more ambitious abatement targets by
the members of the agreement, free-riding through less abatement by non-members
becomes more attractive. On the other hand, if the bulk of the gains from CDM-trading
accrue to the CDM-supplier rather than to the coalition, there is little possibility to raise
participation in a climate agreement. Hence for the success of future climate treaties, it
is of utmost importance to understand how various designs of CDM trading will affect
the success of climate change policy.
We have shown that if emission credit trading is anticipated already during the
negotiations of the allowance caps, and no restrictions are imposed, then a negative
impact on participation and hence on the overall success of a climate agreement has
to be expected. In equilibrium, the access to cheaper abatement via CDM-trading
means that members choose lower emission allowances; non-members benefit from
the associated reduced temperature increase, and from lower abatement costs due to
higher emissions.
In this context, imposing an additionality clause, allowing only emission reductions
below baseline emissions to be sold as emission credits (similar to the additionality
clause of the Kyoto Protocol), has proven to be important. In fact, allowing for hot
air undermines the environmental effectiveness but also the stability of agreements.
Better results could be obtained by introducing so called selling targets, which allow
only emission reductions in excess of a certain threshold to be sold to members. This
allowed members to appropriate a larger share of the gains from trade. In our setting,
it turned out that this was not enough to outweigh the increased incentive to free-ride.
In view of this negative result, we investigated the implications of constraining
abatement choices to preclude increased ambition due to CDM-trade. This implies less
ambitious abatement targets of the members of the agreement and thus a reduction of
the incentive to free-ride.
The role of hot air in this setting turned out to be ambivalent: while it reduces
the environmental effectiveness of the agreement, which is reflected also in reduced
global welfare levels, it may help to draw additional members into the coalition. This
is because it is less costly to comply with the watered down agreement. However, such
larger coalitions were hardly able to outperform a smaller coalition without hot air in
our simulations.
Overall, our results suggest that if CDM-trading is implemented naively (e.g. ignor-
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ing strategic aspects and the need for self-enforcing agreements) and without careful
design, it may do more harm than good to cooperation. One should resist the temp-
tation to use the cost savings derived from trade to aim for a more ambitious climate
agreement. Moreover, the offset mechanism has to be designed such as to channel as
much as possible of the gains towards treaty members, without discouraging the supply
side of emission credits too much.
Finally, our model shares many restrictions of most stylized models. We think the
most interesting extension for future research concerns dynamic membership. That is,
whereas in our model the membership is a one-shot decision, one could allow for the
possibility that countries can revise their decision continuously like in Rubio and Ulph
(2007). Such an extension would allow studying how the design of emission credit
schemes affects participation in successive climate agreements.
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A Model Equations
In this section, we present the details of our numerical model. The model builds on
Lessmann et al. (2009) and Lessmann and Edenhofer (2010) and is extended to include
endogenous choice and trade of emission allowances. In the following, we first describe
the model equations, their calibration, and the numerical procedure to solve the model.
Preferences
The world economy is modelled as a set of N = 9 regions (or players). Players decide
in an intertemporal setting which share of income to consume today and which share
to save and invest for future consumption. Intertemporal welfareWi and instantaneous
utility functionU , which is based on per capita consumption, are given by:
Wi =
Z ¥
0
litU(cit=lit)e rt dt (2)
U(cit=lit) =
8><>:
(cit=lit)1 h
1 h if h 6= 1
log(cit=lit) if h = 1
(3)
where cit and lit denote consumption and labor in region i at time t, respectively. Pa-
rameter r is the pure rate of time preference, and parameter h denotes the elasticity of
marginal utility.
Technology
The economic output yit in each region is produced with a Cobb-Douglas production
technology F with a capital income share of b . Climate change damages (to be defined
below in Equation 16) destroy a fraction 1 Wit of the production.
yit = WitF(kit ; lit) (4)
F(lit ;kit) = (lit lit)1 b k
b
it (5)
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Labor lit is given exogenously, as is labor productivity lit , which grows at a fixed
rate a: lit = expfatg. Capital kit accumulates with investments iit , assuming zero
depreciation.
d
dt
kit = iit (6)
(7)
Emissions and Emission Allowances
Greenhouse gas emissions eit are a byproduct of economic activity yit . We assume
that the emission intensity falls exogenously due to technological progress at rate n .
Beyond this, emissions may be reduced by investments bit into abatement ait , bringing
down the instantaneous emission intensity sit . Parameter x describes the effectiveness
of these investments, and g the effectiveness of the abatement option.
eit = sit e n t yit (8)
sit = (1+ait) g (9)
d
dt
ait = x bit (10)
Emissions can exceed allowances qit , which in our model are chosen endogenously
by individual regions. Emission allowances may be traded internationally (zit denotes
allowance exports by region i), but we exclude intertemporal banking and borrowing,
i.e. total imported and exported allowances must be balanced in every period.
eit = qit   zit (11)
å
j
z jt = 0; t = 1; : : : (12)
Climate Dynamics
Global warming is driven by total global emissions ofCO2 into the atmosphere, which
are equal to cumulative total emission allowances åi qit .For details on the following
climate equations, see Petschel-Held et al. (1999).
d
dt
Ct = zå
j
q jt  k(Ct  C0)+y Et (13)
d
dt
Et = å
j
q jt (14)
Equation 13 translates global emissions into carbon concentration in the atmo-
sphere C. Concentration C rises with global allowances (like emissions do), where
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z converts emissions into changes in concentration, and it decreases with the carbon
uptake of oceans proportional (with factor k) to the increase above the pre-industrial
level C0. The final term limits the ocean carbon uptake (to the fraction 1 y=zk in
equilibrium).
d
dt
Tt = m log(Ct=C0) f(Tt  T0) (15)
Equation 15 transforms concentration levels into a global mean atmospheric tem-
perature increase T . Parameter m controls the strength of the temperature reaction due
to a change in concentration, whereas parameter f is related to its timing. Together,
they can be interpreted as “climate sensitivity” (m=f  log2), i.e. the equilibrium tem-
perature increase due to a doubling of concentration. In view of the inertia of the
climate system, we run the model for 250 years in steps of 10 years.
The climate change damage function Wit is taken from Nordhaus and Yang (1996):
Wit = 1=(1+q1i(Tt)q2i) (16)
Parameters q1i and q2i describe the vulnerability of region i.
Two sets of “book keeping” equations complete the model: the budget constraints
for consumption and investments for each region at every point in time, as well as the
intertemporal budget constraints ensuring that, over the entire time horizon, the import
value must equal the export value in each region.
yit +mit = cit + iit +bit + xit (17)Z ¥
0
ptmit dt =
Z ¥
0
pt xit + pzt zitdt (18)
Variables mit and xit are imports and exports of region i, respectively, and pt and pzt
are the prices of goods and allowances.
Solving the model for the game’s equilibrium
As detailed in the main text, we are considering a two stage game of coalition formation
in which in the first stage, decisions about membership in an international environmen-
tal agreement (IEA), and in the second stage decision about emission allowances are
taken by players.
The game is solved numerically by backward induction, i.e. first we compute PANE
for all possible coalitions, then we test these coalitions for internal and external stability
according to the following criteria:
WijS  WijSnfig for i 2 S (internal stability) (19)
Wj

S > Wj

S[f jg for j =2 S (external stability) (20)
The computation of the PANE in the second stage is complicated by the fact that
we are looking at an intertemporal optimization model, featuring an environmental ex-
ternality as well as international trade at the same time. To the best of our knowledge,
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there are no out-of-the-box solvers available to solve such a model in primal form.
Lessmann et al. (2009) suggest an iterative approach based on Negishi’s approach
(Negishi, 1972). In this paper, we use a modified version of the iterative algorithm,
which works as follows.
Negishi’s approach searches for the social planner solution that corresponds to a
competitive equilibrium by varying the weights di under the assumption of joint welfare
maximization:8
max
fi jt ;b jt ;m jt ;x jt ;z jt : j=1:::Ng
N
å
i=1
diWi (21)
subject to Equations 2-17 (22)
Since this approach exploits the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, it can-
not be applied to an economy with externalities. In principle, this problem can be
circumvented by making any external effect on other players exogenous to the model
(converting variables into parameters that are adjusted in an iteration).
In our context, externalities are climate change damages caused by aggregate global
emissions. In the Nash equilibrium, players will only anticipate the effect that their
emissions have on their own economic output, not, however, the effect this has on other
players’ output. We can mimic this in a social planner solution by giving each player
his own perception of the causal link between emissions and global warming. Instead
of Equation 13, which describes one trajectory of concentration Ct , we introduce N
equations for Cit :
d
dt
Cit = z
 
qit +å
j 6=i
q jt
!
 k(Ct  C0)+y Et 8i=2S (23)
d
dt
Cit = z
 
å
k2S
qkt +å
j=2S
q jt
!
 k(Ct  C0)+y Et 8i2S (24)
where the allowance choices of other players enter as a fixed value (a parameter, in-
dicated by the bar), and are set to the levels of the corresponding variables during the
previous iteration (or some initial value). The sum of allowances in Equation 14 needs
to be adjusted analogously, and the temperature Equation 15 will consequently have N
instances of Tit , too. The temperature change Tit , anticipated by player i, will then enter
in Equation 16 instead of Tt .
The so modified model is then solved in a nested iteration: in the inner iteration, we
solve the model for a given vector q= (qit) of allowance choices repeatedly, updating
qit = qit at the end of each iteration, i.e. we perform a fixed point iteration of the
mapping q = G(q) where G is the best response of players to the exogenously given
strategy qit of the other players. If the inner iteration converges, it converges to a Nash
equilibrium in allowance choices. However, the markets for allowances and private
goods may not be a competitive equilibrium. This is what the outer iteration achieves.
8Note that the intertemporal budget constraint Equation 18, which contains the (a priori unknown) market
clearing prices, is omitted from the model.
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The outer iteration follows the standard Negishi approach: we adjust the welfare
weights di in the joint welfare function (Equation 21) until the intertemporal budget
constraints (Equation 18) are satisfied. The resulting equilibrium is the desired PANE.
Numerical verification of the equilibrium
We verify the resulting ‘candidate’ PANE equilibrium strategies in emissions and trade
numerically by comparing them to the results of the following maximization problems:
8i maxfiit ;bit ;mit ;xit ;zitgWi
subject to Equations 2-18 and prices pt ; pzt
(25)
Deviations of this model from our solution should be only within the order of mag-
nitude of numerical accuracy, which is what we find (not shown). In particular, simul-
taneous clearance of all international markets confirms the competitive equilibrium in
international trade.
Internalization of Damages
In the model and its solution algorithm outlined above, climate change damages that
occur within a region (or coalition of regions) are fully internalized. A priori, this
also holds for the CDM-supplier. However, this particular player represents a number
countries. Hence, full internalization of damages of this group would overestimate the
abatement taken by this player. This point was already made in Nordhaus and Yang
(1996, p. 743). Therefore, they divide the damages perceived by such a representative
player by the number of countries represented by her. This is implemented in our model
in the following way: the anticipated climate change damages Wit in Equation 16 are
only a fraction 1=ni of the original right-hand-side of the equation. In Equation 5, we
add the remaining damages W¯it that were not anticipated, i.e. (Wit + W¯it) instead of
just Wit . The parameter W¯it then needs to be updated in an iteration to W¯it = (ni 
1)Wit . Through this procedure, full damages take effect even though only a fraction is
anticipated.
For the calculations in this study, we set ni= 1 for all players but the CDM-supplier,
where we chose ni large enough such that very little abatement action is taken in the
business-as-usual scenario.
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Parameter Symbol Value
Rate of labor efficiency improvement a 0.023
Income share capital b 0.35
Abatement cost exponent g 0.2
Emission/concentration conversion factor z 0.47
Elasticity of marginal utility h 1
Damage function coefficient q1 0.02
Damage function exponent q2 1.5
Rate of ocean CO2 uptake k 2.15e-2
Labor efficiency l eat
Radiative temperature driving factor m 8.7e-2
Exogenous rate of decarbonization n 0.01
Effectiveness of investments in ait x 5.0
Pure rate of time preference r 0.01
Temperature damping factor f 1.7e-2
Atmospheric retention factor y 1.51e-3
Initial labor productivity a0 1
Initial concentration C0 377
Initial cumulative emissions E0 501
Initial capital stock k0 70
Initial labor l0 6.6
Initial temperature change T0 0.41
Table 1: Parameters and initial values.
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